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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a search and matching model with nominal stickiness à la Calvo
in the wage bargaining. We analyze the properties of the model, first, in the context of a
typical real business cycle model driven by stochastic productivity shocks and second, in a
fully specified monetary DSGE model with various real and nominal rigidities and multiple
shocks. The model generates realistic statistics for the important labor market variables.
JEL-code :  E31, E32, E52, J64.
Keywords: DSGE, Search and Matching, Nominal Wage Rigidity, Monetary Policy.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 97 - OCTOBER 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1
2.  The  Model.................................................................................................................................. 4
2.1  Labor Market Flows .................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Households................................................................................................................................. 5
2.3  Goods  Producers........................................................................................................................ 7
2.3.1  Final  Goods ........................................................................................................................... 7
2.3.2  Intermediate  Goods............................................................................................................... 8
2.3.3  Aggregate  Price  and  Quantity  Indices................................................................................. 10
2.4  Labor  Services.......................................................................................................................... 11
2.4.1  Value of a job for a labor service firm.................................................................................. 12
2.4.2  The  free  entry  condition....................................................................................................... 14
2.4.3  Value of a job for the worker................................................................................................ 15
2.4.4  Wage  Determination............................................................................................................ 17
2.5  Monetary Policy and Government Consumption...................................................................... 17
2.6  Exogenous  shocks.................................................................................................................... 18
3. Results..................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 Calibration................................................................................................................................. 18
3.2 Simulations ............................................................................................................................... 20
3.2.1  Productivity  shock................................................................................................................ 20
3.2.2  Monetary  shock ................................................................................................................... 22
3.2.3  All  three  shocks  together..................................................................................................... 23
4. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 24
References ....................................................................................................................................... 25
Appendixes....................................................................................................................................... 27
National Bank of Belgium Working Paper Series............................................................................. 371 Introduction
Real wage and labor market dynamics are crucial for understanding the inﬂation process. Stan-
dard new-Keynesian models contain only a highly abstract description of the labor market which
does not allow for involuntary unemployment and real wage rigidity. Two keys issues that are
central when monetary policy is faced with complicated trade-oﬀ decisions. Search and match-
ing models, on the other hand, provide a more realistic framework that can be used to analyze
unemployment and wage bargaining situations. For these models to match the stylized proper-
ties of the data, some degree of wage rigidity is necessary. In this paper, we propose a search
and matching model with nominal stickiness ` a la Calvo in the wage bargaining. We analyze
the properties of the model, ﬁrst, in the context of a typical real business cycle model driven
by stochastic productivity shocks and second, in a fully speciﬁed monetary DSGE model with
various real and nominal rigidities and multiple shocks. The model generates realistic statistics
for the important labor market variables.
Standard new-Keynesian DSGE models approach the labor market as a duplicate of the goods
market: households supply diﬀerentiated services in a monopolistic competitive market which
provide them with monopoly power over the wage. The resulting wage is determined as a
mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, where the
mark-up may vary due to nominal stickiness. At the given wage, ﬁrm decide on their optimal
demand for labor and workers will deliver the requested labor service. For realistic parameters
of labor supply and nominal wage stickiness, these model reproduce the observed volatility in
hours worked and the relative smooth behavior of real wages over the business cycle (see for
instance Shimer (2002) or Shimer (2004) for empirical evidence on the cyclical behavior of labor
market variables). However these models are ignorant among other things on the concept and
the role of unemployment and other labor market ﬂows, on the speciﬁc nature of continuing
labor contracts and the resulting wage bargaining, and on labor adjustment along the intensive
and the extensive margins. Therefore, these standard new-Keynesian models can hardly be
considered as realistic characterizations of the labor market and any normative analysis based
on the welfare implications of these models might result in misleading conclusions.Search models ` a la Pissarides-Mortensen overcome some of the weaknesses of the standard new-
Keynesian labor market models by starting from the speciﬁc nature of the labor market. Match-
ing workers and ﬁrms is costly and this results in a surplus for existing jobs and a bargaining
situation over the wage and possibly broader working conditions. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto
(1996) integrated this search and matching setup in a general equilibrium model and illustrated
its relative success to explain cyclical behavior in wages and employment ﬂuctuations. More
recently, Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004) showed that these models fail to generate the observed
volatility in unemployment and job vacancies. The reason is that under standard parameteriza-
tion, new vacancies induce a strong reaction in the real wage that erode the proﬁtability of new
job creation. Wage rigidity, especially for new jobs (see Bodart, Pierrard, and Sneessens (2005)),
can overcome this reaction and boost the sensitivity of labor market variables. Following up
on this idea, Gertler and Trigari (2006) introduce wage staggering ` a la Calvo in the bargaining
solution, and show how the spill over eﬀects of the slowly adjusting aggregate wage mitigate the
change in the new contract wage. For realistic contract durations, this mechanism produces
the observed relative smooth wage response while doing ﬁne on the volatility of vacancies and
unemployment as well. Gertler and Trigari execute their exercise in a basic real business cy-
cle model that is exclusively driven by productivity shocks and where no explicit distinction is
necessary between nominal and real wage setting.
Another series of papers - Walsh (2005), Trigari (2004), Moyen and Sahuc (2005) - have studied
the role of labor-search frictions for inﬂation dynamics and the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. These models combine the labor matching function in a wholesale production
sector with sticky nominal prices in the ﬁnal retail sector. By altering the wage formation
process, compared to the standard new-Keynesian framework, these models also change the
cyclical behavior of the marginal cost and inﬂation. In particular, these models are able to
show how institutional factor, such as the bargaining power and the replacement beneﬁt for
unemployed workers, can aﬀect inﬂation. Trigari (2004) also point out that the marginal cost
can behave diﬀerently depending on whether the required labor adjustment takes place along
the intensive margin, i.e. via changes in hours worked, or along the extensive, i.e. employment
margin.
2The integration of wage rigidities and nominal price stickiness in the labor-search models has
been analyzed by Krause and Lubik (2005), Christoﬀel and Linzert (2004), Blanchard and Gali
(2005) and Christoﬀel, Kuster, and Linzert (2006). Krause and Lubik claim that the real wage
rigidity is important for matching the labor market volatilities but that wage rigidity is not
crucial for the inﬂation dynamics. This follows from the argument by Goodfriend and King
(2001) that the period-by-period wage looses its allocative role in the marginal cost in the
context of long term labor relations, which are implicitly assumed in the matching labor market
setup. Christoﬀel et al. integrate various forms of wage rigidities and nominal price stickiness
in a fully speciﬁed DSGE model and estimate this model to German data. Their results show
that important labor market shocks are necessary to ﬁt the wage and employment data but
these shocks have a limited role on the overall dynamics of output and inﬂation. Blanchard and
Gali analyze the implication of real wage rigidity for monetary policy. The ineﬃcient reaction
of wages and employment to productivity shocks complicates the stabilizing task for monetary
policy because it creates a conﬂict between inﬂation targeting and employment stabilization.
In this paper we extend the work of Gertler and Trigari (2006), by incorporating the wage
staggering a la Calvo in a model with nominal price and wage setting together with a se-
ries of other frictions that are often considered as necessary to capture the cyclical dynam-
ics in consumption, investment and production (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003)). In addition, ﬁrms have the possibility to adjust the labor input
along the intensive and extensive margin. In order to get suﬃcient persistence in the labor mar-
ket dynamics, we also evaluate alternative cost schedules for the vacancy and hiring decisions:
a standard recurrent vacancy cost ` a la Mortensen-Pissarides, a variable recurrent hiring cost ` a
la Gertler-Trigari and a Fujita-Ramey type of sunk cost for vacancy posting.
First, we evaluate the cyclical properties of our model by concentrating exclusively on the labor-
search friction in combination with nominal wage staggering. The volatility, the persistence
and the cyclical nature of the labor market variables in our model are directly compared to the
results in Gertler and Trigari. We show that the results depend on the writing of the vacancy
costs and that the model with sunk cost does well (and at least as well as Gertler and Trigari)
at reproducing the main variable cyclical properties. Then we consider the extended version of
3our model that contains the complete set of nominal and real frictions typically used in the new
generation of monetary DSGE models, and we evaluate whether this model is still able to perform
well on the labor market statistics both for real and nominal shocks. The extensive model, and
especially the model with a sunk vacancy cost, proves also successful in reproducing the typical
labor market volatilities and correlations. However, some drawbacks remain as the too strong
reaction of hours and the inability of the model to generate a lagged response of inﬂation to a
monetary shock. These simulation exercises point out the important parameters and frictions
that are at work in the model. We consider these exercises as a necessary preliminary step before
taking the model to the data in a more elaborate estimation procedure.
2 The Model
We consider three broad categories of agents: households, ﬁrms and the government, together
with three types of markets: goods, labor and capital. We distinguish two types of goods
producers, ﬁnal goods and intermediate goods. Perfect competition is assumed on the ﬁnal goods
market and monopolistic competition on the intermediate goods market. On the capital market,
the supply is determined by the stock of capital previously accumulated by the household.
The return on capital adjusts to make the quantity demanded by the representative ﬁnal ﬁrm
equal to the predetermined capital stock. We introduce labor market frictions ` a la Mortensen-
Pissarides. We assume a single representative household. Consumer-workers may be employed
or unemployed1.
2.1 Labor Market Flows
Let Nt represent the total number of jobs. Normalizing the total labor force to one yields the
following accounting identity:
Nt + Ut = 1 (1)
1This representative household formulation amounts to assuming that workers are perfectly insured against the
unemployment risk. This simpliﬁcation is common in the literature (see for instance Merz (1995) or Andolfatto
(1996)) and reﬂects the current state of the art. Taking into account workers heterogeneity due to imperfect
insurance markets would make the model totally intractable.
4where Ut denote the number of unemployed job-seekers. Let the number of job matches be
denoted by Ht. We assume that the number of matches is a function of the number of job
vacancies Vt and eﬀective job seekers Ut, that is, we use the following matching function:















We assume an exogenous job destruction rate s, implying the following employment dynamics:
Nt+1 = (1 − s) Nt + qt Vt, (5)
= (1 − s) Nt + pt Ut. (6)
2.2 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by τ. Each household maximizes an intertemporal












where β is the subjective discount factor. Instantaneous utility U is a function of current con-
sumption Cτ
t and real cash balances Mτ
t /Pt. External consumption habit eﬀects are introduced























External consumption habits are represented by an eﬀect of past aggregate consumption. Each
household (worker) is looking for a full-time job and can be employed or unemployed. Fol-
lowing Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we assume that there exist state-contingent
securities that insure the households against variations in household speciﬁc labor income. With
5perfect insurance markets and with separability between consumption and leisure, employed and
unemployed worker will have the same marginal utility of wealth and choose the same optimal
consumption level and money demand. Individual behaviors can then be analyzed in terms of
the representative household’s optimization program. We normalize total population to 1 and
deﬁne Nt as the fraction of workers hired at time t − 1 or before and productive at time t. The

























Bt−1 (1 + Rt−1)
Pt
+ Wt + bt (1 − Nt), ∀ t ≥ 0 .
(8)
Wt stand for aggregate income received by employed workers; bt is an unemployment beneﬁt2;
Tt stand for total lump-sum taxes. The inﬂation rate πt = Pt/Pt−1 − 1 determines inﬂation
taxes and Rt is the nominal interest rate between t − 1 and t:
(1 + Rt) = (1 + rt)(1 + πt+1). (9)
We allow for variations in labor working time (or hours) ht and for variations in the capacity
utilization rate zt, at a cost Ψ(zt). We also take into account capital installation costs, measured
by a function of investment changes Φ(∆It/It−1). This leads to the following aggregate income
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It − δ Kt−1 . (12)
The employed worker’s labor income is made of two parts, a base wage wt plus an overtime
work compensation Ch
t . Normal working time is normalized to 1 and overtime compensation is
proportional to the diﬀerence between actual and normal working time3. Hours are decided by
2It could alternatively be interpreted as the income generated by the domestic activities of an unemployed
worker.
3An alternative modelization would be to introduce hours in the (des)utility function. This formulation would
allow hours to vary with the marginal utility.
6the ﬁrms and, at the steady state, overtime compensation is equal to zero. Total capital income
is equal to the return on utilized capital net of capacity utilization costs Ψ(zt). The normal
utilization rate is normalized to 1. Πt are the proﬁts redistributed by the intermediate goods























The consumer’s optimal decisions are then given by:
Bt: UCt = β (1 + rt) UCt+1 , (15)
zt: rk
t + δ = d0 z
c1
t , (16)
























































We assume a CES production technology:
Yt =






with λx positive but smaller than unity to ensure decreasing marginal productivity. The proﬁt








Yt , ∀ i ∈ [0,1]. (23)
7The price index is given by:
Pt =



















where ˜ Kt(i) = zt Kt−1(i); ǫt is an aggregate exogenous productivity shock and θ ≤ 1 (produc-
tivity concave in hours).
Hours of work
Intermediate good ﬁrms rent the desired quantity of workers from labor service ﬁrms, at a price
dt per worker determined by the market. Hours of work may vary over time. Overtime work is
paid Ch





















   1
1+c1
, (27)
with c1 ≥ 0. To obtain h = 1 at stationary equilibrium, we set c0 = θd. For c1 → ∞, hours of
work are constant.
Marginal Cost
At given selling price Pt(i) (and corresponding output level Xt(i)), the intermediate goods
producer’s optimization program is a standard cost minimization program, implying the same














8Because we assumed constant returns to scale and price taking behavior on the input markets,
the (real) marginal cost Λx































All intermediate goods producers who are allowed to reset optimally their selling price at time
t face exactly the same optimization problem. Let us denote P∗
t the optimal price reset at time





















where ξp is the probability that the price cannot be reset from one period to the next (perfect
price ﬂexibility is thus obtained for ξp = 0). The discount factor βt+j is compatible with the
pricing kernel used by consumers-shareholders:
βt+j = βj UCt+j
UCt
. (31)






(1 + ¯ π)j P∗
t
Pt+j
 −1/(1−λx)  









= 0 . (32)
A transitory increase in the aggregate demand (following a monetary shock e.g. ) will thus lower
the current average markup rate, both because some intermediate goods prices are not reset (a
fraction ξp of them) and because reset prices do not fully adjust to transitory cost changes.
4The computation of the optimal price P
∗
t is based on the information available at time t. A more careful
notation should thus include the conditional expectation operator Et. Our simpliﬁed notation is easier to read.
One has to bear in mind though that all future variables are actually conditional expectations. For instance Zt+j
stands for Et (Zt+j), where Z may be any variable or combination of variables. It is worth noticing that our
notation is in line with the conventions used in the Dynare software (cf. http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/).
92.3.3 Aggregate Price and Quantity Indices
Aggregate demand for labor and capital services
All intermediate goods producers use the same production technology (capital-labor ratio). With
constant returns to scale, the demand for labor and capital is linear in output. The aggregate
demand for labor and capital is thus proportional to aggregate output, even though diﬀerent
ﬁrms may have diﬀerent production levels.




Xt(i) di , (33)



















The value of ¯ Pt can be computed by using the property that in any period t − j (with j ≥ 0)



























The aggregate price index is given by equation (24). With Calvo contracts, a fraction (1−ξp) of
previous period prices is reset optimally, while a fraction ξp is simply indexed to trend inﬂation
5The second expression can be obtained directly by using the fact that reset prices (a fraction (1 − ξw) of all
prices) are chosen at random. The price index computed over unchanged prices (a fraction ξw of all prices) is
thus equal, up to the indexation factor, to the previous period price index.
10¯ π. Because the individual prices that can or cannot be revised are chosen randomly, the value
of the price index aggregating all prices that are not reset optimally is equal to the aggregate
price index of the previous period, scaled up for trend inﬂation. The new aggregate price level










= (1 − ξp) [P∗
t ]
− λx
1−λx + ξp [(1 + ¯ π) Pt−1]
− λx
1−λx . (37)
Log-linearizing around steady-state values yields :
˜ pt = (1 − ξp) ˜ p∗
t + ξp ˜ pt−1 . (38)
Final Goods Production
The previous results (see equation (34)) can be used to write the “ﬁnal goods production func-
tion” as follows6:
Yt =
















Labor services are oﬀered to intermediate goods ﬁrms by “labor packers”. Labor packers are
perfectly competitive intermediaries who rent labor services from households and sell these
services to intermediate goods producers at a rate dt.
The wage paid by existing labor service ﬁrms is not bargained again in every period. We assume
instead a Calvo framework, wherein only a fraction (1 − ξw) of all existing wage contracts is
renegotiated every period. All other nominal wages are simply adjusted for trend inﬂation ¯ π.
New jobs are paid either the average or the freely negotiated wage. The respective proportions
are κ and (1 − κ). Full nominal wage ﬂexibility obtains for ξw = κ = 0. With κ = 0 and
6Notice though that the log-linearized form of equation (36) is similar to that of the true price index (see
equation (38)). The distinction between ¯ Pt and Pt and between Xt and Yt thus vanishes in a log-linearized model.
11ξw = 1, the nominal wage of all new jobs would be freely negotiated while the nominal wage of
all existing jobs would simply be indexed on trend inﬂation.
Although they all have the same productivity, diﬀerent workers may thus be paid diﬀerent





Pt represent the real value of the nominal wage negotiated at time
t; wt stands for the average real wage observed at time t. Let Nt(xt−j) represent the number of
workers employed at time t at a wage ﬁxed at time t−j and since then simply indexed on trend
inﬂation, where xt−j ǫ{w∗
t−j , wt−j} represents the real value of the wage at time t − j. Total


















t−j) + wt−j Nt(wt−j)
 
.
2.4.1 Value of a job for a labor service ﬁrm
We assume that when a job is destroyed, it deﬁnitively disappears and its asset value is therefore
equal to zero. The asset value AF
t (w∗




t) = (dt − w∗
t) + βt+1 (1 − s)
 











where the discount factor βt+1 is compatible with the pricing kernel used by consumers-shareholders
(see (31)). It will prove convenient to recast this value in marginal utility terms by multiplying
both sides of the above expression by UCt. Let us deﬁne AF
t+j = UCt+j AF
t+j. We thus obtain:
AF
t (w∗
t) = UCt (dt − w∗
t) + β (1 − s)
 











The second term inside the square brackets is the value of a job whose wage was negotiated one
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= UCt dt +
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t (wt) of a new job starting with a wage equal to the average wage wt can be obtained
in the same way. Starting from:
AF
t (wt) = (dt − wt) + βt+1 (1 − s)
 
(1 − ξw) AF
t+1(w∗


















+ β (1 − s)AF
t+1(wt+1) . (48)
2.4.2 The free entry condition
Let AN
t represent the asset value of a new job, which can be written as follows:
AN
t = (1 − κ) AF
t (w∗
t) + κ AF
t (wt). (49)
13The asset value of a vacant job AV
t is then given by:
AV
t = −ct + βt+1 qt AN
t+1 + βt+1 (1 − qt) AV
t+1 , (50)
where ct is the recurrent cost of opening a vacancy. We alternatively consider three cases for ct,
yielding three variants of the model : (i) a constant recurrent cost, (ii) a variable recurrent cost,
and (iii) a sunk cost.
Constant recurrent cost
In this variant, we assume that ct = a1, as in the standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
framework. The free entry condition implies that AV
t = 0 and equation (50) can be recast in:
a1 = qt βt+1 AN
t+1 . (51)
Total vacancy costs are given by:
vt = ct Vt . (52)
It is worth noting that the average cost per hiring is ct/qt, that is a1/qt in this setup. The
variant of the model derived under this assumption is denoted MP-model hereafter.
Variable recurrent cost
In this second case we follow Gertler and Trigari (2006) and drop the assumption of a ﬁxed
recurrent cost. Instead, we suppose that the total cost of adjusting the workforce is a2 x2
t Nt,
with the hiring rate xt = Ht
Nt, which can be recast in a2 xt Ht. The cost per hiring ct/qt (see
before) may therefore be expressed as a2 xt. Again, with the free entry condition AV
t = 0,






Total vacancy costs are still given by equation (52). The model variant adopting this variable
recurrent cost is labeled GT-model in the sequel.
Sunk cost
In the third variant of equation (50), we drop the recurrent cost (ct = 0). Instead, as Fujita and Ramey
(2005), we assume that a sunk cost SC has to be paid only once when the new vacancy is cre-
14ated. The sunk cost may diﬀer across ﬁrms and let the continuous function F(SC) give the total
mass of ﬁrms that have a sunk cost no greater than SC. Then equation (50) can be written as:
AV
t = βt+1 qt AN
t+1 + βt+1 (1 − qt) AV
t+1 . (54)






and the law of motion of vacancies is:
Vt = (1 − qt)Vt−1 + nt . (56)






In the rest of the paper we will refer to this variant of the model as being the FR-model.
2.4.3 Value of a job for the worker
The household optimization program discussed in section 2.2 can be recast in terms of a value
function WH
t . In this alternative setup, the household’s optimization program can be written

















implying the optimality conditions detailed in section 2.2. The value of WH













t (xt−j) = ∂WH
t /∂Nt(xt−j) denote the marginal utility value at time t of a job whose
wage was ﬁxed at time t − j (with j ≥ 0) at a value xt−j (either w∗
t−j or wt−j) and has never
since been renegotiated. From equation (58) and the envelope theorem, one obtains:
AH
t (xt−j) = UCt
 
(1 + ¯ π)j Pt−j
Pt










− β κpt AH
t+1(wt+1) + β (1 − s)ξw AH
t+1(xt−j) .
(60)
15We assume that, as wages, the unemployment beneﬁt is indexed on long-run inﬂation7. Because
of its impact on the outcome of the wage negotiation, we are most interested in the marginal
value of a job whose wage is currently renegotiated. By combining the above expressions, this
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The value of the ﬁrst part of the ﬁrst summation term appearing on the left-hand side of (61)
has already been deﬁned (see deﬁnition of S1



















t and next subtracting β (1 − s)ξw AH
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(62)
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Let parameter ψ measure the individual worker’s bargaining power. The bargained wage comes






















t)/UCt denote the asset value (measured
in units of the ﬁnal goods) of a job, calculated from the worker’s and the ﬁrm ’s point of view
respectively. The ﬁrst-order optimality condition implies the following sharing rule:
(1 − ψ)AH
t (w∗
t) = ψ AF
t (w∗
t). (66)
The economy wide average wage wt satisﬁes:
Nt wt = (1 − s) Nt−1
 
ξw
1 + ¯ π
1 + πt









where Ht is the number of new jobs (hirings) created at time t and Nt = (1−s)Nt−1+Ht−1. In
the particular case where κ = 1 (all new jobs have wage equal to the average wage), one obtains:
wt = (1 − γ)
1 + ¯ π
1 + πt
wt−1 + γ w∗
t .
2.5 Monetary Policy and Government Consumption
The interest rate is determined by a reaction function that describes monetary policy decisions:
1 + Rt = ft (1 + Rt−1)0.9
 




1 + ¯ π
 1.5 0.1
, (68)
where ft is an exogenous monetary policy shock. In this simpliﬁed Taylor rule, monetary au-
thorities respond to deviation of inﬂation from its objective ¯ π.
17We also keep the simplest possible representation for government consumption: we assume no
non-monetary public debt. Government expenditures are thus tax and/or monetary ﬁnanced.













+ Tt , (69)
where gt is an exogenous government consumption shock. The government chooses Tt so as to
satisfy its budget constraint.
2.6 Exogenous shocks
To close the model, we need to precise equations governing the monetary, government consump-
tion and productivity shocks:
ft = (1 − ρf) ¯ f + ρf ft−1 − v
f
t , (70)
gt = (1 − ρg) ¯ g + ρg gt−1 + v
g
t , (71)





As Gertler and Trigari (2006), we choose a monthly calibration. As usual, we have an annual
capital depreciation rate of 10% (δ = 10%/12) and an elasticity of production with respect to
capital α = 1/3.
Labor market
Parameters related to the labor market are identical to Gertler and Trigari (2006). Since there
is no strong evidence on the bargaining power, we assign equal power to both workers and
ﬁrms (ψ = 0.5). And as usual, the worker bargaining power is equal to the match elasticity to
unemployment (ψ = 1−φ). The separation rate s = 0.035 is standard and supported by strong
18empirical evidences. The unemployment beneﬁt is supposed constant bt = ¯ b and we choose this
replacement ratio ¯ b/w to be 0.4. We impose two restrictions: both the job ﬁnding rate and
vacancy ﬁlling rate must be 0.45 at the steady state. These restrictions yield the values ¯ h = 0.45
and a1 = 1.63 (MP-model). Parameters for the GT- and FR- models are derived to keep the
same steady state. More precisely, in the GT-model, a2H/N = a1/q. In the FR-model, we
deﬁne F(SC) = SC/γ and we choose γ to reproduce the same level of vacancies8.
Preferences and interest rate
We use the results of Smets and Wouters (2003) to calibrate the utility function9. We set the
habit formation parameter e = 0.85, the money demand parameters νm = 5 and χ = 1.98.
Setting β = 0.997 implies an annual real interest rate of 3.7% ∼ = (1/0.997)12 −1. We assume an
annual inﬂation of 2%, which gives ¯ π = 2%/12.
Utilization rates and investment cost
We suppose a quadratic overtime income (c1 = 1) and we choose c0 = θd to normalize normal
working time to 1. The productivity of hours is concave and θ = 0.5. Similarly, we suppose
a quadratic capital utilization cost (d1 = 1) and we choose d0 = r + δ to normalize capital
utilization rate to 1. Finally, as in Smets and Wouters (2003), the investment cost is ϕ = 12.
Nominal rigidities
Most of the these parameter values are borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2003). The elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods is 10, the average duration of a price contract is
slightly more than two years whereas the average duration of a wage contract is less than one
year. More precisely, we have λx = 0.9, ξp = 0.962 and ξw = 0.888. Moreover, we assume that
the probability to bargain a new wage is the same that the probability to bargain an old wage,
that is κ = ξw.
Shocks
We use conventional values for all these parameters. The monetary policy shock is centered
around 1 and has no persistence , the government consumption shock is centered around 0.15
(government expenditures represent 15% of GDP) and has an autoregressive parameter ρg =
0.901/3, and the productivity shock is centered around one and has an autoregressive parameter
8It is easy to show that γ =
β AN
V (1−β(1−q)).
9The quarterly parameters are transformed in monthly ones.







∼ N(0,Σ), where Σ11 =
(0.005/12)2, Σ22 = Σ33 = 0.0052 and Σij = 0.
3.2 Simulations
We examine the behavior of the model taking the technology shock as the exogenous driving
force. Then we look successively at the model responses to an interest rate shock and to the
three shocks (productivity, monetary, government) all together.
3.2.1 Productivity shock
Base model with only real wage rigidities
Gertler and Trigari (2006) modify the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework, by allowing
for staggered multi-period wage contracts and by dropping the assumption of a ﬁxed vacancy
cost. They show that their model can reasonably well reproduce the cyclical behavior of the
labor market observed in the data. The ﬁrst point we want to examine is how our model
behaves with respect to their. For this, we remove all the frictions (except the frictions in the
labor market) in our model to get something similar to Gertler and Trigari (2006): e = 0 (no
consumption habit), c1 → ∞ (no overtime work), d1 → ∞ (no variable capital utilization rate),
ϕ = 0 (no capital adjustment cost) and ξp = 0 (ﬂexible prices). For the rest, (labor market
block) we adopt a similar calibration (see previous sub-section). Table 1 shows the relative
standard deviation, the contemporaneous correlation with output and the serial autocorrelation
for the key - labor market - variables. The statistics reported are for US data (taken from
Gertler and Trigari (2006)), the original Gertler and Trigari (2006) model - GT (2006) hereafter
-, and our model with the three diﬀerent types of free entry condition described above: the MP-,
GT-, and FR-models.
Firstly, we see that we have small diﬀerences between the GT (2006) original results and our
model with a similar type of vacancy cost (GT-model). They are explained by remaining dif-
ferences between the two approaches, as for instance the speciﬁc way to introduce the variable
20vacancy costs.
Secondly, it is well known that wages bargained every period lead to too highly volatile and
procyclical wages (see for instance Shimer (2004)). Here, because of the staggered wage setting,
all models are able to reproduce a realistic wage dynamics. However, the standard matching
MP-model (with a constant vacancy opening cost) fails to reproduce the volatility and the
autocorrelation for the main labor market variables (employment, vacancies and tensions). The
poor performance of this variant of the model can be explained by the rapid adjustment of
vacancies following a shock. By introducing an opening cost proportional to the hiring rate
(GT-model) or a sunk cost (FR-model), we allow vacancies to adjust sluggishly and we increase
the standard deviation and the persistence. Overall, the GT- and especially the FR-model (with
wage rigidities and speciﬁc entry costs) do well in capturing the basic features of the data. In
particular, the FR-model variant performs as well the original GT (2006) model. It produces
less realistic volatilities but performs better in reproducing data correlations and persistences.
Complete model with nominal rigidities
We now conduct the same simulations but with the complete model including the other frictions
and nominal rigidities. But rather than comparing our model (the three versions) to the original
GT (2006), we compare it to a more standard DSGE model with monopolistic competition on
both the goods and the labor market, denoted MC-model hereafter.10 The calibration is identical
for the MC-model and the three versions of our matching model. The results are displayed in
Table 211.
Monopolistic competition models are successful at explaining a number of phenomena, but
suﬀer from some shortcomings related to their simpliﬁed representation of the working of the
labor market. More precisely: (i) there is no explicit discussion of equilibrium unemployment
ﬂuctuations, (ii) there is no distinction between employment and hours of work change, and
10See for instance Smets and Wouters (2003) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005))
11In the matching models, we are able to make the distinction between employment Nt and hours ht. Total
hours are then deﬁned as the product of employment and hours: ht Nt. We are also able to make the distinction
between the base wage wt and the overtime compensation C
h
t . The hourly compensation is deﬁned as the base
wage plus the overtime pay, divided by hours: (wt + C
h
t )/ht.
21(iii) they do not generate enough persistence in employment. The matching model generates
unemployment, makes an explicit distinction between employment and hours (extensive vs.
intensive margins) and, since it incorporates a sluggish labor reallocation process, generates a
higher employment persistence. However, the matching model with standard constant vacancy
costs (MP-model) is unable to amplify the productivity shock and still generates a too low
volatility for main variables (at the exception of total hours). As explained before, alternative
vacancy costs (GT- and FR-models) allow to strongly improve the results.
Further insights into the diﬀerences between models are given in Figures 1 and 2. The em-
ployment reaction depends on the way we write the vacancy costs. In the standard MP model,
the ampliﬁcation is quite weak. When we remove the usual free entry condition (GT- and FR-
models), we increase the ampliﬁcation as well as the persistence. In a monopolistic competition
model, a positive productivity shock ﬁrst decreases total hours. The matching models also
give an initial decrease (due to the initial fall in hours, see Figure 312) but the decrease is less
pronounced and the subsequent positive eﬀect is more persistent.
Globally, the FR-model does quite well in capturing the basic features of the data. However,
comparing last columns of Table 1 and Table 2, we see that the FR model statistics are slightly
better in the base model. Adding nominal rigidities and other frictions creates new interactions
with the rest of the model and may deteriorate the statistics.
3.2.2 Monetary shock
The main motivation for introducing the additional nominal and real frictions is that it is
interesting to consider a broader DSGE setup to investigate the implications for monetary policy.
The standard framework for analyzing monetary policy is indeed the Smets and Wouters (2003)
or the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) type of models that provides a realistic picture
for the aggregate demand reaction to monetary policy shocks.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Trigari (2004) represent the dynamic responses
of the US economy to an expansionary monetary policy shock. Their main ﬁndings are that:
12Impulse responses with the FR model. But similar graphs would be generated with the MP or GT models.
22(i) output responds with a high persistence, (iii) individual hours do not react strongly, (iii) the
response of total hours is even more persistent than output but with a lower amplitude, (iv) the
reaction of inﬂation is lagged and highly persistent, (v) wages react very weakly, and (vi) the
real interest rate declines sharply but quickly returns to its initial level.
In Figure 4, we plot the IRF’s to a monetary shock for our diﬀerent models13. We see that the
three models respond similarly to a monetary shock. The lower interest rate reduces savings
and increase demand, which requires higher employment. Since employment cannot immediately
respond in the MP- and FR-models, labor adjustment is ﬁrst realized through hours. It is a
promising result that the search models can do as well as standard models with monopolistic
competition on the labor market, for the monetary transmission toward wages and prices (and
at the same time give a more realistic description of labor market ﬂows). However, both the
MP- and FR-models still fail to reproduce the weak reaction of hours and the delayed reaction
of inﬂation, as it is also the case for the MC-model.
A complete summary of statistics is reported in Table 3. As already mentioned, all the models
behave quite similarly.
3.2.3 All three shocks together
In this section, we conduct the same simulation exercises as previously, but with the three
shocks (productivity, monetary and government shocks) all together. Table 4 displays the results
and we see they are quite similar to those displayed in Table 2, stressing the importance of
the productivity shock in cyclical ﬂuctuations. Focusing now on the FR model, it is worth
noting that the statistics are even slightly better in the setup with the three shocks than in the
setup with only the productivity shock (volatilities deteriorate but correlation with output and
persistence improve). This suggests FR is a promising model and that a complete estimation of
this model could be of great interest.
13We only consider the MC, MP and FR models. The GT model results are very close to the FR model.
234 Conclusion
Our model performs well on reproducing the stylized facts of real wage and labor market variables
both in its simple and extended version, although the last one needs further ﬁne-tuning of the
parameters. A complete estimation of the model will oﬀer further insight on what frictions and
what type of shocks are crucial for maximizing the explanatory power of the model. Additional
data on labor market ﬂow variables are needed to identify the exact nature of the vacancy costs.
The use of hours worked and employment data is necessary to pin down the relative cost of
labor adjustment along the intensive or extensive margin. Detailed data on wages are needed to
evaluate whether the adjustment costs along the intensive margin are cyclical, for instance via
the marginal utility of households, or not. Another remaining issue is the importance of cyclical
employment adjustments via endogenous separation and on-the-job search behavior.
All these issues might have an impact on the wage-price dynamics. In these labor-search models
with ongoing employee-employer relations, the marginal cost appears as a complicated function
of current and future contract wages as well as of overtime premiums and employment adjustment
costs. As a result, the interaction between inﬂation and wages becomes more complicated and
dependent on the labor market tightness. In our model, the price decision, the marginal cost and
the labor cost formation are determined in three separate sectors: the retail ﬁrms, the wholesale
production ﬁrms and the labor service ﬁrms. It is not yet clear whether and how the integration
of these three sectors might aﬀect further the connection between wage and price decisions. The
work by Kuster (2006), where the search friction is integrated into the price setting sector, oﬀers
useful additional insight for the interaction between price and wage setting. More theoretical
and empirical work is needed to clarify all these issues. A major limitation for further empirical
work is the availability and the quality of data on labor market ﬂows and detailed wage costs.
Especially within the euro area, the lack of statistical data impede further empirical research.
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264.1 Appendix 1: Summary of the main equations
If we deﬁne mt ≡ Mt/Pt, ¯ Pt ≡ ¯ Pt/Pt and P∗
t ≡ P∗




























It − δ Kt−1, (75)
Yt = It + Ct + gtYt + vt + ψ(zt)Kt−1, (76)
UCt = β (1 + rt) UCt+1, (77)
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M-P version: ct = a1 ; AV
t = 0 ; vt = ctVt, (106)




t = 0 ; vt = ctVt, (107)










29Wage determination and labor ﬂows
ψAF
t (w∗
t) = (1 − ψ)AH
t (w∗
t), (110)
Ntwt = (1 − s)Nt−1
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Policies and exogenous shocks
1 + Rt = ft (1 + Rt−1)0.9
 




1 + ¯ π
 1.5 0.1
, (116)
gtYt = mt − mt−1 +
πt
1 + πt
mt−1 + Tt, (117)
ft = (1 − ρf) ¯ f + ρf ft−1 − v
f
t , (118)
gt = (1 − ρg) ¯ G + ρggt−1 + v
g
t, (119)
ǫt = (1 − ρe)¯ ǫ + ρeǫt−1 + ve
t. (120)
30three types of free entry conditions
US Data GT (2006) MP GT FR
relative standard deviation
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
wage 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.59
labor share 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.49 0.63
employment 0.60 0.35 0.24 0.44 0.32
unemployment 5.15 4.46 3.12 5.63 4.11
vacancies 6.30 5.83 4.83 7.48 5.25
tensions 11.28 9.88 7.61 12.80 9.20
productivity 0.61 0.71 0.80 0.65 0.76
contemporaneous correlation with output
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
wage 0.56 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.67
labor share -0.20 -0.56 -0.78 -0.39 -0.54
employment 0.78 0.77 0.87 0.88 0.83
unemployment - 0.86 -0.77 -0.87 -0.90 -0.87
vacancies 0.91 0.91 0.64 0.84 0.91
tensions 0.90 0.94 0.76 0.89 0.91
productivity 0.71 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.97
serial correlation
output 0.87 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.84
wage 0.91 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95
labor share 0.73 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.67
employment 0.94 0.90 0.74 0.88 0.91
unemployment 0.91 0.90 0.74 0.88 0.91
vacancies 0.91 0.83 0.45 0.80 0.88
tensions 0.91 0.88 0.60 0.85 0.90
productivity 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.75 0.76
US Data: taken from Gertler and Trigari (2006), GT (06): simulation results directly taken from Gertler and Trigari (2006),
MP: own simulations with free entry condition ` a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), GT: own simulations with free entry
condition ` a la Gertler and Trigari (2006), FR: own simulations with free entry condition ` a la Fujita and Ramey (2005).
Table 1: Productivity shock: summary of the base model statistics
31three types of free entry conditions
US Data MC MP GT FR
relative standard deviation
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
base wage 0.26 0.29 0.25
hourly compensation 0.52 0.41 0.28 0.31 0.27
labor share 0.51 0.70 0.45 0.52 0.54
employment 0.22 0.42 0.37
total hours 0.60 0.90 0.74 0.79 0.79
unemployment 5.15 2.89 5.35 4.77
vacancies 6.30 3.64 6.58 5.83
tensions 11.28 6.43 11.80 10.49
productivity 0.61 0.72 0.57 0.50 0.51
contemporaneous correlation with output
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
base wage 1.00 0.85 0.80
hourly compensation 0.56 0.90 0.99 0.85 0.81
labor share -0.20 0.01 -0.26 -0.09 -0.20
employment 0.99 0.98 0.95
total hours 0.78 0.72 0.82 0.88 0.86
unemployment -0.86 -0.99 -0.98 -0.95
vacancies 0.91 0.89 0.98 0.99
tensions 0.90 0.94 0.99 0.98
productivity 0.71 0.49 0.69 0.61 0.63
serial correlation
output 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
base wage 0.93 0.96 0.97
hourly compensation 0.91 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.96
labor share 0.73 0.71 0.66 0.73 0.76
employment 0.93 0.95 0.95
total hours 0.94 0.75 0.86 0.89 0.89
unemployment 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.95
vacancies 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.94
tensions 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.95
productivity 0.79 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.76
Same deﬁnitions as in table 1, MC: monopolistic competition model ` a la Smets and Wouters (2003).
Table 2: Productivity shock: summary of the full model statistics
















Figure 1: Impulse response functions to an aggregate productivity shock
















Figure 2: Impulse response functions to an aggregate productivity shock














Figure 3: Impulse response functions to an aggregate productivity shock











































Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a monetary shock
34three types of free entry conditions
US Data MC MP GT FR
relative standard deviation
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
base wage 0.15 0.33 0.23
hourly compensation 0.52 0.24 0.18 0.34 0.23
labor share 0.51 0.37 0.25 0.42 0.28
employment 0.40 0.66 0.52
total hours 0.60 1.16 1.07 1.11 1.08
unemployment 5.15 5.18 8.45 6.63
vacancies 6.30 7.63 11.20 8.49
tensions 11.28 12.33 19.21 14.85
productivity 0.61 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.09
contemporaneous correlation with output
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
base wage 0.98 0.66 0.22
hourly compensation 0.56 0.81 0.99 0.70 0.35
labor share -0.20 0.97 0.99 0.82 0.57
employment 0.97 0.98 0.91
total hours 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
unemployment -0.86 -0.97 -0.98 -0.91
vacancies 0.91 0.74 0.95 0.99
tensions 0.90 0.87 0.98 0.98
productivity 0.71 -0.94 -0.88 -0.91 -0.87
serial correlation
output 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.86
base wage 0.87 0.94 0.94
hourly compensation 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.94 0.95
labor share 0.71 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.95
employment 0.79 0.88 0.91
total hours 0.94 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.87
unemployment 0.91 0.79 0.88 0.91
vacancies 0.91 0.56 0.81 0.88
tensions 0.91 0.68 0.85 0.90
productivity 0.79 0.88 0.83 0.89 0.92
Same deﬁnitions as in table 1, MC: monopolistic competition model ` a la Smets and Wouters (2003).
Table 3: Monetary shock: summary of the full model statistics
35three types of free entry conditions
US Data MC MP GT FR
relative standard deviation
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
base wage 0.21 0.26 0.22
hourly compensation 0.52 0.31 0.23 0.28 0.23
labor share 0.51 0.51 0.36 0.45 0.45
employment 0.24 0.43 0.37
total hours 0.60 1.02 0.85 0.88 0.88
unemployment 5.15 3.14 5.59 4.72
vacancies 6.30 4.34 7.09 5.85
tensions 11.28 7.26 12.48 10.44
productivity 0.61 0.51 0.45 0.41 0.43
contemporaneous correlation with output
output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
base wage 0.84 0.73 0.56
hourly compensation 0.56 0.76 0.88 0.76 0.63
labor share -0.20 0.25 -0.12 0.04 -0.12
employment 0.96 0.94 0.88
total hours 0.78 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.91
unemployment -0.86 -0.96 -0.94 -0.88
vacancies 0.91 0.84 0.96 0.96
tensions 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.93
productivity 0.71 0.20 0.50 0.47 0.50
serial correlation
output 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88
base wage 0.93 0.96 0.96
hourly compensation 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.96
labor share 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.76 0.76
employment 0.85 0.92 0.94
total hours 0.94 0.76 0.79 0.83 0.83
unemployment 0.91 0.85 0.92 0.94
vacancies 0.91 0.67 0.88 0.92
tensions 0.91 0.77 0.90 0.93
productivity 0.79 0.73 0.76 0.74 0.76
Same deﬁnitions as in table 1, MC: monopolistic competition model ` a la Smets and Wouters (2003).
Table 4: All three shocks together: summary of the full model statistics
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